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Copyrights and Design Patents-
The Common Zone Between
Albert P. Sharpe, III*
T HE OVERLAPPING OF OUR PRESENT-DAY Copyright and Design
Patent Laws, apparently initially created by random legis-
lative development and recently aggravated by the decision of
the Supreme Court in Mazar v. Stein,' has resulted in a legal
morass of substantial proportions.
The purpose of this paper is to explore briefly the influence
which gave rise to this situation, to discuss the present state of
the law and its practical impact upon the practicing patent ad-
vocate, and finally to review and evaluate proposed legislation,
past and present, in an effort to determine the possible course
of future developments.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
To understand adequately the nature and the extent of the
area of overlapping protection under the Copyright and Design
Patent Laws, it is first necessary to trace in a general way the
historical evolution of these laws from the time of their incep-
tion to the present.
A. Development of the Copyright Law 2
Modern concepts of copyright date as far back as 1710 when
in England the celebrated Statute of 8 Anne was enacted. The
Statute of Anne has been considered the forerunner of all legis-
lation for the protection of literary property and provided for
penalties to be levied against one who reprinted or imported
protected books without the consent of the authors or proprie-
tors. Surprisingly, the Statute of Anne promulgated two of the
three requirements, namely registration and deposit of copies,
contained in our present Copyright Law.
Member of the Ohio Bar; Former Examiner, U. S. Patent Office.
347 U. S. 201 (1954).
2 For a more complete treatment of the historical development of the Copy-
right Law see DeWolf, An Outline of Copyright Law 1-20 (1925); Witten-
berg, The Law of Literary Property 13-58 (1st Ed. 1957); Nicholson, A
Manual of Copyright Practice 3-12 (2d Ed. 1956).
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Various other European nations followed England's example
in the middle and late 18th century and the early 19th century,
and the first American experiments with statutory copyright
came in 1783 when Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Maryland
adopted copyright laws of one sort or another. Pursuant to a
recommendation by Congress later in that same year that copy-
right protection be instituted for protection of United States
citizens generally, New Jersey, New Hampshire, and Rhode Is-
land also enacted copyright legislation of varying types.
Apparently, however, state legislation was largely unsatis-
factory and the Constitutional Convention in 1787 incorporated
into the Constitution of the United States a provision for the
protection of intellectual property rights.3 Congress was given
the power
To promote the progress of science and useful arts by se-
curing for limited times to authors and inventors the ex-
clusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.
Acting under the authorization of the constitutional enactment,
Congress in 1790 passed into law the first Federal Copyright
Act,4 which provided for the protection of "books, maps, and
charts." The Act required registration of claim and deposit of
copies, but not until 1802 was it amended5 to require that a
work to be protected carry a copyright notice. At the same
time, copyright protection was extended to historical prints.
Through successive amendments to the Act of 1790, the area
within which copyright protection would be granted was amended
to include in 18316 "any print or engraving"; in 1856, authors
or proprietors of dramatic compositions were granted the right
of public performance; in 1865, the Act was expanded to in-
clude protection for photographs; and in 18707 the law was sub-
stantially revised and the classes of works which were declared
eligible for protection were set forth as being: Any book, map,
chart, dramatic or musical composition, engraving cut, print, or
photograph or negative thereof, painting, drawing, chromo, statue,
statuary, and models of designs intended to be protected as works
3 Art. I, Sec. 8.
4 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
5 2 Stat. 171 (1802).
6 Revision of 1831, 4 Stat. 436 (1831).
7 Par. 86, 16 Stat. 212 (1870).
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol11/iss2/18
11 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)
of the fine arts. In 18918 and in 19059 laws were passed with a
view toward extending some measure of copyright protection
to foreigners; in 189710 the Register of Copyrights and his staff
were established; and finally in 1909, the Copyright Statute
which forms the basic foundation for that presently in force"
was enacted.
It is perhaps significant to note that the Act of 1909, which
superseded previous copyright legislation, deleted the Fine Arts
clause of the 1870 Act so that "works of art and models or de-
signs for works of art" were eligible for copyright protection
under the statute.12 Very possibly it was this very Act that laid
the groundwork for subsequent conflict between design and
copyright forms of protection.
B. Development of Design Patent Law 13
As was the case with copyrights, the advent of the United
States into the realm of legislation for protection of designs for
articles of utility or manufacture came several years after the
initiation of similar activities on the part of European countries.
Protection for designs was available in France as early as 1737,
and England made provision for such protection in 1787 by en-
actment of Statute 27 Geo. 3, Ch. 38.
The efforts of the United States relative to Design Patents
date from 1842 when Congress afforded protection for a manu-
facture, whether metal or other material; any new and original
design for the printing of woolen, silk, cotton, or other fabrics;
any new and original design for a bust, statue, bas-relief, com-
position in alto or basso relievo; any new and original impress-
ion or ornament to be placed on any article of manufacture, the
same being formed in marble or other material; any new and
useful pattern, print or picture to be worked into, worked on,
or printed, painted, cast, or otherwise fixed on any article of
8 26 Stat. 1109-1110 (1891).
9 33 Stat. 1000 (1905).
10 29 Stat. 481 (1897).
11 The Act of 1909 [35 Stat. 1075 (1909) ] with some amendments was codified
into law pursuant to an Act of 30 July 1947, and now appears as Title 17
U. S. Code.
12 See 35 Stat. 1076g (1909).
13 For a more detailed discussion of the development of Design Patent pro-
tection see: Shoemaker Patents for Designs, 8-22 (1929); Hudson, A Brief
History of the Development of Design Patent Protection in the United
States, Journal of the Patent Office Society, 30 J. P. 0. S. 380 (1948).
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manufacture; and any new, useful, and original shape or con-
figuration of any article of manufacture. 14 About twenty years
later, the Act of March 2, 186115 was passed into law and did
not confer a scope of protection materially different from that
of the earlier Act.
Some nine years passed and the Patent Act of July 8, 187010
was promulgated and took the place of previous Design Patent
legislation. The Act of 1870 did not depart in any substantial
respect from the Act of 1861 except that the provision for prints
for woolen, silk, cotton, or other fabrics, deleted from the Act
of 1842 by the Act of 1861, was restored. In 1874, the law pertain-
ing to Design Patents was codified into positive law and became
part of the revised statutes.1 7 Subsequently, the Act of May 9,
190218 evolved and under the terms of this Act, the specification
of particular designs for which patents would lie was deleted in
favor of the more general designation, "Article of Manufacture,"
on the theory that this term was amply descriptive of all those
classes of design which had been enumerated in previous en-
actments. 19
In the years immediately preceding the Act of 1902 some
confusion had arisen regarding the interpretation to be placed
upon the word "useful" in determining the patentability of a
given design. However, in 1872 the Supreme Court held that the
Acts which authorized the granting of patents for designs con-
templated not so much utility as appearance, and that it was the
appearance of the object which constituted mainly, if not entirely,
the contribution to the public which the law deemed worthy of
recompense.20 To avoid, in line with this decision, the previously
existing implication that functional utility was to be considered
as having a significant bearing on design patentability, rather
than ornamental appearance, the Act of 1902 substituted the
word "ornamental" for the word "useful" as it had been em-
ployed in earlier enactments. Some consideration had been
14 5 Stat. 543 (1892).
15 12 Stat. 246 (1861).
16 16 Stat. 209 (1870).
17 Rev. Stat. Secs. 4929-4933.
18 32 Stat. 193 (1902).
19 For an expression of the interpretation given by the Commissioner of
Patents to the term "article of manufacture" as used in the Act of 1902, see
his statement to the Committees of Congress quoted in Ex Parte Fulda, 194
0. G. 549; 1913 C. D. 206.
20 Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U. S. 511 (1872).
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given to the use of the term "artistic" instead of the term
"ornamental," but the former eventually was abandoned in favor
of the latter.
The Act of 1902 is the basis of our present Design Patent
Law and pursuant to the Patent Act of July 19, 1952,21 it has
been consolidated with utility patent laws and enacted as Title
35 of the United States Code. Under the terms of the present
statute, whoever invents any new, original and ornamental de-
sign for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor.2 2
C. Evolution of the Overlapping Zone of Protection Under the
Copyright and Design Patent Laws
Perhaps one of the factors which has contributed to the twi-
light area between copyrights and design patents, and probably
the first such factor in point of time, is the constitutional au-
thorization itself. It has been seen that the basis for both patents
and copyrights is to be found in the same constitutional passage.
This passage is said to represent a classic example of the bal-
anced composition popular during the Colonial period and over
the years has caused a considerable amount of confusion to law-
yers seeking to interpret its meaning.
If the constitutional authorizing clause is taken disjunctively,
it may be broken down into two separate statements. First, Con-
gress shall have the power to promote the progress of science by
securing to authors the exclusive right to their writings and,
second, Congress shall have the power to promote the progress
of the useful arts by securing to inventors the exclusive right to
their discoveries. To appreciate fully the meaning intended to be
given the clause by the drafters of the constitution, one must be
cognizant of the fact that in those days the words "science" and
"art" had somewhat different meanings than they do today. The
word "science" as used in the constitutional enactment bore
more the connotation of learning in general than that of natural
science. Similarly, the word "art" bore more the connotation
of technology, or useful crafts, than perhaps it does in our
modern era. Hence, it was the apparent intention of the founding
fathers that authors' writings be protected to promote general
learning and that inventors' discoveries be protected to promote
the useful arts.
21 66 Stat. 792 (1952).
22 35 U. S. C. 171 (1953).
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For our purposes, these considerations are germane only
because they illustrate that the interpretation of the constitu-
tional enactment to reveal its true meaning is not so elementary
as it might at first blush appear to be. Consequently, it is a
matter which has been surrounded by a degree of popular
uncertainty. As the years passed, the environment within which
the enactment was born became more isolated in point of time,
and the situation became ripe for the development of areas of
confusion. The constant but subtle modification of the meaning
of words, and the modernization of the language no doubt con-
tributed to misunderstandings and misapprehensions concerning
the respective objectives of the copyright and the patent systems.
Even were it otherwise, it may be logically asked whether there
exists some common ground where general learning and useful
arts becomes so intertwined as to be one and the same. At any
rate, the uncertainty which prevailed was reflected in the
development of the law of intellectual property.
Another contributing factor appears to have been gradual
expansion of the scope of applications of copyrights and the
design patents, both by the legislation itself (as appears from
the outline above of the statutory development of the respective
forms of protection), and by the courts. Parenthetically, one
wonders whether the Constitutional Convention, at the time
Article 2, Section 8, was drafted, had in mind that the term
"writing" should be given a meaning as broad as that which it
is accorded under present implementing legislation and under
prevailing judicial sentiment, or that the scope of the patent
system should be such as to include ornamental works. It is
currently clear that such items as photographs, jewelry, glass-
ware, stationery and so on are proper subject for copyright
protection. At the time the Constitution was adopted, almost
the only works considered worthy of copyright were books. While
early legislation expanded somewhat on this concept, it was not
until nearly 100 years later that models of designs intended to
be protected as works of the fine arts were considered sufficiently
significant to merit copyright protection; and as we have seen,
the first provision for design patents came some 60 odd years
after adoption of the Constitution.
Be that as it may, the fact remains that the terms "authors"
and "writings," as used in the original constitutional authori-
zation, have through the years been expanded gradually to
include meanings not ordinarily attributed to the words, when
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol11/iss2/18
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used in their general sense. In 1884, the Supreme Court, in
holding a photograph copyrightable, adopted the definition of an
"author" as being "he to whom anything owes its origin;
originator; maker; one who completes a work of science or litera-
ture." The Court then proceeded to indicate that "writings," as
used in the Constitution, was meant to include all forms by
which the idea in the mind of the author are given visible
expression. 23 Presumptively, this definition of the term "writ-
ings" would include nearly any concrete work product of an
author. It is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the Court's
concept of the "author" of a "writing," as expressly in this
instance, from present concepts of the "inventor" of an "orna-
mental design."
Early evidence of the existence of a possible conflict between
copyrights and design patents is to be found in the case of Louis
deJonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler.24 The lower court was
of the opinion that a design representing sprigs of holly, mistle-
toe, and spruce, arranged in the shape of a square and repeated
on a single sheet twelve times for use as holiday wrappings (an
item of obvious utility), was a "writing" copyrightable as paint-
ing and also an ornamental design patentable as such, but held
against the copyright owner on the basis of defective copyright
notice. The Circuit Court of Appeals reserved opinion as to
whether the sphere of copyright and design patent overlapped
but affirmed the decision of the lower court relative to the
insufficiency of statuory notice. The decision of the Circuit Court
was affirmed by the Supreme Court which similarly withheld
judgment relative to the overlapping zone between the two
forms of intellectual property involved.
Evidence again arose in 1921, this time concerning three-
dimensional works. A copyright and a design patent for a doll,
known as a "kewpie" were held valid and infringed, 25 but in the
process the court avoided a consideration of the issue as to
whether or not the plaintiff could simultaneously have copyright
and design protection, inasmuch as by a consent decree in the
lower court the defendant had agreed that both patent and
copyright were valid. Some six years later, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals indicated that either design patent
23 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sacony, 111 U. S. 53 (1884).
24 182 F. 150 (D. C. Pa. 1910), aff'd, 191 F. 35 (3d Cir. 1911), aff'd, 235 U. S.
33 (1914).
25 Wilson v. Haber Bros., 275 F. 346 (2d Cir. 1921).
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or copyright (as a label) would be proper for a hosiery ticket
design.26 In 1936 the Pennsylvania District Court held that a
design for a cemetery monument was a copyrightable "design
for a work of art" within the meaning of the Copyright Act,
notwithstanding the fact that the monument was an article of
manufacture as well as an object of art.2 7 More recently it was
held that a loop design as a decoration for glassware was either
design patentable or copyrightable within the purview of the
appropriate statutes.
28
These cases illustrate that over a period of several years,
the courts tended gradually, in line with constant literalization
of statutory law, to extend the frontiers of copyright protection
into the realm of designs incorporated in useful articles and
consequently into that traditionally occupied by design patents.
The Copyright Office itself seems to have played a part in
this metamorphosis as may be determined from an examination
of its own changing interpretation of the scope of the copyright
laws. In 1910 the pertinent copyright regulations interpreting
the 1909 Act defined works of art as including all works be-
longing fairly to the so-called fine arts, and including paintings,
drawings, and sculpture. Productions of the industrial arts,
utilitarian in purpose and character, were not considered subject
to copyright registration even if artistically made or orna-
mented.29 This view on the part of the Copyright Office seems to
have prevailed even though, as we have seen, the 1909 Act
substituted the term "works of art" for the term "works of fine
art" as it had appeared in the Act of 1870.
The Office's interpretation of the Act appears to have been
relaxed mildly in 1917 when the copyright regulations were
rephrased to indicate that the protection of productions of the
industrial arts, utilitarian in purpose and character, even if
artistically made or ornamented, depends upon action under the
Patent Law; but registration in the Copyright Office has been
made to protect artistic drawings, notwithstanding they may
afterwards be utilized for articles of manufacture.30 Under this
latter terminology, it would appear that, in the eyes of the
26 In re Blood, 23 F. 2d 772 (D. C. Cir. 1927).
27 Jones Bros. v. Underkoffier et al., 16 F. Supp. 729 (N. D. Pa. 1936).
28 William A. Meier Glass Co. v. Anchor Hocking G. Corp., 95 F. Supp. 264
(N. D. Pa. 1951).
29 Rules and Regulations for the Registration of Claims to Copyright, Bul-
letin No. 15 (1910-8).
30 37 C. F. R., 1939, Par. 201.04(7).
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Copyright Office, subsequent incorporation of a design, once
copyrighted, in a utilitarian article would not be fatal to the
copyright, at least if there were no intent at the time of regis-
tration to make such incorporation.
More currently, works of art as a category have been
described by the regulations of the Copyright Office as including
works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form, but not
their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned, such as
artistic jewelry, enamels, glassware, and tapestries, as well as
all works belonging to the fine arts, such as paintings, drawings
and sculpture.3 1
Consequently, when the changing attitudes of the Congress,
of the courts and of the Copyright Office are examined and
compared, a concurrent and constantly increasing recognition
of designs incorporated in useful articles as being copyrightable
is to be noted. We have already seen that from the time of in-
ception of design patent protection it was within the contem-
plation of the legislature to extend protection to ornamental
works embodied in utilitarian articles of manufacture, with
significance being placed upon appearance rather than utility.
With the expansion of copyright frontiers came a situation in
which two completely different systems were committed to the
protection of virtually the same form of visual expression, and
ultimately a situation in which protection under either system
was made available for a form possessed of particular character-
istics, i.e., a work of art.
The question of the presence or absence of an area of over-
lap between copyrights and designs was resolved definitely by
the advent of the landmark case of Mazer v. Stein.32 That case
involved the validity of copyright for statuettes of male and
female dancing figures made of semi-vitreous china intended
for use and used as bases for table lamps with electric wiring,
sockets, and lamp shades attached. The copyright owner had
been involved in much litigation in various circuits concerning
the copyrighted subject matter prior to the Mazer v. Stein suit.
In most instances he had come off second best, for the courts
involved had adopted a theory that copyright ought not to lie
for a work intended as a utilitarian article. It was accordingly
the position of these courts that the copyright owner should
have protected himself by design patent rather than by copy-
31 37 C. F. R., 1939, Par. 202.8.
32 See note 1 supra.
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right.3 3 The Supreme Court, after an exhaustive review of the
authorities and of the development of the copyright law, held
that the lamp bases were copyrightable as "works of art." The
court indicated that "the dichotomy of protection for the aesthetic
is not beauty and utility but art for the copyright and the in-
vention of original and ornamental design for design patents."
The Court found nothing in the copyright statute to support the
argument that either the intended use or the actual use in in-
dustry of an article eligible for copyright bars or invalidates its
registration. The Court placed significance on the fact that the
Act of 1909 had replaced the term "fine arts" as used in the
Act of 1870 with the term "works of art" and expressed the view
that this amendment destroyed verbal distinctions between
purely aesthetic articles and useful works of art and that the
Copyright Statute as amended was intended to include more
than the traditional fine arts.
Mazer generally is recognized as the foundation for the now
prevailing view that the incorporation of a "work of art" in a
utilitarian article does not bar copyright. The case does not
hold, apparently, that each and every industrial design may be
protected by copyright, but only those which may be independ-
ently classified as "works of art." Just what constitutes a copy-
rightable "work of art" on the one hand and an uncopyrightable
industrial design on the other, is not a matter capable of precise
definition. However, the Copyright Office has prepared the
following test:
If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the
fact that the article is unique and attractively shaped will
not qualify it as a work of art. However, if the shape of a
utilitarian article incorporates features, such as artistic
sculpture, carving, or pictorial representation, which can
be identified separately and are capable of existing inde-
pendently as a work of art, such feature will be eligible for
registration. 34
As a result of the prevailing view, it will be apparent im-
mediately that there is in fact an area of intellectual endeavor
33 Stein v. Expert Lamp Co., 96 F. Supp. 97 (D. C., N. D. Ill.), af'd, 188 F.
2d 611 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U. S. 829 (1951). Stein v. Rosenthal, 103
F. Supp. 227 (D. C., S. D. Cal. 1952), aff'd, 205 F. 2d 633 (9th Cir. 1953);
Stein v. Benaderet, 109 F. Supp. 364 (E. D. Mich. 1952), rev'd, 214 F. 2d 822
(6th Cir. 1954), pursuant to the holding of the Supreme Court in Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U. S. 201 (1954).
34 Copyright Office Regulations, as amended June 18, 1959, 37 C. F. R.
Par. 202.10 (c).
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within which both copyright and design patents will lie. The
existence of this fact gives rise to a rather perplexing question
relative to selection of the form of protection to be obtained for
the design falling within this area.
(a) Practical Considerations in Selecting the Form of Pro-
tection under the Present State of the Law.
The term "selection" has been used with making a determi-
nation of the type of protection to pursue on behalf of a client.
For some time the lower courts have thought that the owner of
intellectual property might choose whether he wished copyright
or patent protection, but that he could have only one form of
statutory protection and would be bound by this election.35 The
Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein recognized the existence of
this doctrine but refused to pass upon it, thereby leaving validity
of the doctrine of election in doubt, but at least unchallenged
by the High Court. Recognizing that few patent cases ever
reach the Supreme Court these days, the practicing attorney
will accept the election doctrine, even though with reservation,
and proceed to choose between the two forms of protection
available for works of art.
In making a selection, one must consider many factors. The
ease with which each form of protection can be obtained, the
expense involved, the time required, the mortality rate in the
courts of the copyright as opposed to the design patent, the
scope of protection to which each form is accorded, and the
manner of proofs which will be required of the litigant in a
copyright or design patent suit, are but a few of the factors
which must be taken into account in making a final determination
of the type of protection to obtain for a given design.
Perhaps one of the most important of these is the ease with
which a copyright, or a design patent, may be obtained. This is
determined in large measure by the tests for copyrightability and
for design patentability. The primary prerequisite for copy-
rightability is originality, i.e., the work to be copyrightable must
be original with the author. The courts have interpreted the
requirement for originality to mean little more than a prohibition
35 See notes 24 and 26-28 supra; Cf. Korzybski v. Underwood & Under-
wood, Inc., 36 F. 2d 727 (2d Cir. 1929), where it was held that it might be
possible for a given article to have features protectable both by utility
patent and by copyright if the article had sufficient significance as a work
of art or science apart from the disclosure in the specification of the pat-
ent but not if there was no substantial distinction between the disclosure
of a utility patent and the design of the copyright.
May, 1962
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of actual copying. 36 On the other hand to be eligible for design
patent, a work must not only be novel and ornamental, but also
it must be inventive. There must be something akin to genius
• . . an effort of the brain as well as the hand.37 The standard
of invention required for design patents is as high as that for
utility patents. 8
The difficulty with which a design patent may be obtained is
considerably greater in comparison to that involved in securing
a copyright. By its very nature the design patent system is one
of examination, while the copyright system is essentially one
of mere registration of claim. The application for a design
patent must go through a period of evaluation in the Patent
Office for novelty and inventiveness (or more modernly, un-
obviousness). An application for copyright, on the other hand,
is accepted almost immediately and there is no examination
process involved other than a determination of whether the work
sought to be copyrighted falls within the statutory area of
copyright eligibility, i.e., whether the work is the writing of an
author, as defined by the courts.
The examination procedure by the Patent Office of an
application for a design patent may extend over a period of two
years or more and during this time the services of an attorney
are required to assist in the processing of the application through
the office. Not only is this procedure quite costly as compared
with the processing of copyright applications, but it also has
presented a considerable thorn in the side of some industries,
such as dressmakers, for example, where the commercial use-
fulness of a given design has come and gone before patent pro-
tection is granted.
From the standpoint of theory, patent protection once
granted, should be much stronger than copyright protection as
a result of the presumption of validity which supposedly at-
taches to a design patent once issued. 39 As a practical matter,
however, the courts have whittled away upon this presumption
until now only a vestige remains. An unofficial survey of recent
design patent litigation conducted by the writer indicates that
36 Alfred Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F. 2d 99 (2d Cir.
1951).
37 Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U. S. 674 (1892).
38 Sixway Corp. v. McCurdy & Co., 11 F. Supp. 734 (N. D., N. Y. 1935),
rev'd-in-part, 35 F. 2d 5 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 592 (1936).
39 35 U. S. C. Par. 282, A patent shall be presumed valid. The burden of
establishing invalidity of a patent shall rest on a party asserting it.
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perhaps but one in three or four design patents is adjudicated
valid. While this survey may not be entirely representative by
reason of bias in sampling techniques, it does most certainly
establish a recognizable trend.
A consideration of vital concern in making an election of
protection revolves around the matter of infringement. Because
the granting of a design patent confers upon the patentee the
exclusive right to make, use and sell the patented invention,"
it need only be shown to establish design patent infringement
that in the eye of the ordinary observer, using the attention that
a purchaser usually gives, the alleged infringing design so de-
ceives the observer that he is induced to purchase it, thinking
it to be the patented design.41 This holds true regardless of
whether the infringer knowingly copied the infringing design,
or whether he contrived the same independently.
In contrast, the copyright owner is given essentially only
the right to print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the work
which is the subject of copyright. Thus, to prove infringement
of copyright, there must have been a copying of the work, for if
the accused conceived his work independently, there is no
infringement. 42  Therefore, it is normally necessary for the
copyright owner to prove access to the work on the part of the
one charged with infringement. This is a considerably more
rigid requirement than in the case of design patents and some-
times may be difficult of proof. Where the copyright owner is
unable to prove access the similarities between the copyrighted
work and the alleged infringing one must be so striking as to
preclude any possibility that the defendant might have arrived
at his result independently of plaintiff. 3 If it is possible to show
access the copyright owner need show only a substantial copy-
ing or appropriation of the work.44
Once an infringement has been shown, innocent vendors
and so-called "secondary users" such as retailers, dress pattern
publishers, repair part manufacturers and motion picture pro-
ducers are not exempted from liability by existing copyright
40 35 U. S. C. 271a.
41 See note 20 supra; Nagel Chase Mfg. v. Kofsky, 71 F. 2d 967 (3d Cir.
1934).
42 Sheldon v. Metro Goldwyn, 81 F. 2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936); 91 F. 2d 978 (2d
Cir. 1937).
43 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F. 2d 454 (2d Cir. 1946).
44 National Institute for Improvement of Memory v. Nutt, 28 F. 132 (D. C.
Conn. 1928), aff'd, 31 F. 2d 236.
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statutes and having participated in the infringement 45 may be
held to account by the copyright proprietor. Obviously, this
feature confers rather sweeping protection upon the owner of
a copyright.
Similarly, liability for design patent infringement extends
not only to the producer of the infringing work, but also to
those who make use of it or who market it for the patent owner
is given not only the exclusive right to make the protected
design, but also to use and to sell it.
The foregoing comparison of the respective requirements
for infringement of copyrights and design patents at first glance
seems to indicate that the copyright proprietor is put to con-
siderably more strenuous proofs in establishing his case in an
infringement situation than is the owner of a design patent. This
situation seems to be greatly illusory, however, as a result of the
failure of the courts to hold design patents in particularly high
esteem. The strict requirements for design patentability re-
specting novelty and invention are so rigidly applied by the
courts that the patent owner faces the strong possibility that his
patent may be declared invalid. This consideration normally
should outweigh the advantage which technically design patents
possess in regard to proofs.
A further favorable aspect of the copyright lies in the 56-
year term of protection available as compared with the 14-year
period secured by the granting of a design patent. The copy-
right owner may, therefore, extend his protection over a period
of time four times as great as that during which the design
patentee is protected.
Copyrights, as favorable a form for the protection of designs
as they appear to be, are not entirely without their short-
comings. A condition precedent to obtaining copyright protection
is publication with statutory notice.46 Publication of a work
without notice invalidates the copyright and dedicates the prop-
erty in the work to the public. Difficulties have arisen in several
instances relative to the matter of what constitutes proper
statutory notice. The court in the deJonge47 case held that
where a repetitive design was involved the statutory notice
must be reproduced at least once for each repetition of the
design. Failure to do so on the part of the copyright owner
45 Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co., 230 F. 412 (2d Cir. 1916).
46 17 U. S. C. par. 10.
47 See note 24 supra.
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invalidated the copyright. The practical problems which present
themselves as a result of such a requirement are self-evident.
In contrast, notice is not a prerequisite to securing design
patent protection and a given work of art may be published
or reproduced and sold without prejudice to securing a subse-
quent design patent, with the exception that in order to avoid
the public use bar, application must be made within six months
of the first public use or sale. It follows that in the case of a
patent, the availability of design protection is less likely to be
lost by inadvertence or ignorance of the creator.
Further possible shortcomings relative to copyright pro-
tection may lie in the strict interpretation which the Copyright
Office has given the Mazer v. Stein case. While the Register of
Copyrights does not submit applications to examinations for
novelty or invention, works of art embodied in utilitarian articles
are subjected to the close scrutiny to determine whether they
truly constitute "works of art" and thus fall within the realm
of copyright protection as applied to useful articles. It is not
unlikely that, as the number of applications for registration of
designs incorporated in utilitarian marks increases, this scrutiny
will become more severe. Even so, statistics indicate that
despite refusal of many applications, artistic registrations granted
in the fiscal year 1960 were, in the utility field, some 70 percent
greater than registrations in the prior year.48
All things considered, under the present state of the law,
the advantages to be obtained by protecting works of art through
copyright appear in most instances to outweigh the advantages
available through design patent protection.
(b) Historical Review of Legislative Proposals Relative to
Designs and Copyrights.
For a period of nearly 50 years there has been almost con-
tinous agitation for legislation to solve some of the rather
serious problems entailed in protecting commercial designs. The
usual tone of proposed legislation has been an emphasis on copy-
right principles rather than upon those of patent. The first
general attempt to base design protection on copyright instead
of design patent precepts came during the second session of the
63rd Congress in 1914, when the Oldfield Bill4 9 was introduced
48 Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copy-
rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Con., 2d Sess., at 56(1960).
49 H. R. 11321, 63d Congress, 2d Session (1914). A companion bill (S. 3950)
was concurrently introduced to the Senate by Mr. James.
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into the House of Representatives. This bill provided for pro-
tection of any original design for a manufactured product upon
application by the author and the grant of a registration. Under
the provisions of the bill, protection would have been made
available for features of pattern, shape, and form as well as
surface design, for a period of 3, 10, and 20 years, and a certifi-
cate of registration was to have been prima facie evidence of
exclusive right of the registrant to the protected design.
Support for the bill came largely from the silk and stove
manufacturers, and from the Merchants' Association of New
York. Opposition came principally from the National Protective
Repair Association which felt that the bill would permit manu-
facturers to obtain an unwarranted monopoly over repair and
replacement parts. While it was generally agreed that the bill as
a whole represented a considerable improvement over the existing
Design Patent Law, no action on it was taken by the legislative
branch. Modified versions of the original Oldfield Bill were
introduced during the years 1915, 1916, 1917, 1918 and 1924.
While these bills contained some variations over the earlier bill,
the underlying principles were essentially the same. Here again,
no further action was taken.
During the period from 1924 to 1931, a series of bills were
introduced to the House and Senate by Mr. Vestal. The Vestal
Bills, like their predecessors, were founded basically upon copy-
right principles for the protection of design. There were some
rather substantial variations from bill to bill in the series, par-
ticularly with regard to the presence or absence of a requirement
for publication with notice. Various of the Vestals Bills were
much discussed at the time and were generally recognized as
a needed improvement in the realm of intellectual property pro-
tection. The bills, however, were met with strong opposition
from several quarters, notably repair part manufacturers, style
magazine and pattern publishers, lace manufacturers and various
retail interests.
In 1930 one of the bills5" was passed by the House of Repre-
sentatives and sent to the Senate where it was referred to the
Senate Committee on Patents. Hearings were conducted before
the Committee on December 16, 1930 and January 8, 1931, at
which time the scope of the bill was restricted in application to
original designs for textiles, lace, and embroideries of all kinds,
furniture, lamps and lighting fixtures, shoes or other footwear,
50 H. R. 11852, 71st Congress, 2d Session (1930).
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and jewelry or articles manufactured from gold, silver and other
precious metals, on the theory that the bill passed by the House,
which covered practically all fields of activity in manufacture,
might work unforeseen hardships and might be difficult to ad-
minister.
The minority report presented objections to the bill, based
upon the theory that because it was limited to specific categories
of designs, it represented class legislation. The minority felt
also that the bill was unconstitutional because if original designs
were to be protected regardless of novelty, and science, the use-
ful arts would not be promoted. The bill was finally reported
out of Committee on January 26, 1931, but was never voted
upon by the Senate.
Later in that same year, in the first session of the following
Congress, the bill was reintroduced into the House and the
Senate but died in Committee without having been reported out.
After some eight years of unsuccessful attempts, Mr. Vestal's
name fades from the list of those actively engaged in the intro-
duction of design legislation to Congress but others took up
where he had left off and in the years 1932 to 1935, renewed
efforts were made without success. Generally, the bills intro-
duced during this period of time were sharply restricted insofar
as the scope of the area to be protected was concerned. Several
required a test of novelty as a prerequisite to securing pro-
tection. One effort of particular interest is that of Mr. Payser
in 1934.51 His bill was based on a considerably different principle
from previous ones mentioned and declared design piracy to
be an unfair method of competition. Like its forerunners, this
bill failed to make appreciable headway.
The next significant attempt for legislation came in 1935 in
the form of the Duffy Copyright Bill,52 of which only the Van-
denberg amendment concerned protection of designs. This
amendment provided that the author of any artistic model or
design to be applied or embodied in any manufactured product,
could obtain a copyright therefor upon compliance with the
Copyright Act. This time, the Senate took the initiative and after
a further amendment excluding motor cars and accessories
from the designs eligible for protection, passed the bill on July
29, 1935. After passage by the Senate, the proposed enactment
was referred to the House, which this time was the culprit and
51 H. R. 7359, 73d Congress, 2d Session (1934).
52 S. 3047, 74th Congress, 1st Session (1935).
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took no further action on the bill. Modifications of the Duffy
bill with the Vandenberg amendment were introduced to Con-
gress in 1936, 1937, 1939, 1940 and 1941, but failed to receive
acceptance. Bills of sharply limited scope for the purpose of
protecting designs for textile fabrics were introduced in 1946
and 1947 without success.
The more current legislative proposal of importance is the
Willis bill5" originally introduced in 1957 to the first session
of the 85th Congress and later introduced in two revised ver-
sions in 1959 to the first and second sessions of the 86th Congress.
These two revised bills, while differing from one another in two
material respects, represent a comprehensive approach to the
solution of the serious problems confronting designers today,
and merit careful examination.
The first bill in point of time is entitled "A Bill to Encourage
the Creation of Original Ornamental Designs for Useful Articles
by Protecting the Authors of Such Designs for a Limited Time
Against Unauthorized Copying." 54 It would create a hybrid
design patent and copyright type of protection although it more
closely resembles the classic copyright concept. Under the
terms of the bill, an original ornamental design consisting of
those original elements of a useful article that are intended to
give the article an ornamental appearance could be protected
upon making known the design by publicly exhibiting, distribu-
ting, offering for sale, or selling it with design notice applied. The
form of the notice would be much like that of copyright and
would include the words "protected design" or an abbreviation
thereof, or the letter "D" within a circle D, together with the
year when the design was first made known and the name of
the proprietor. After registration, the registration number may
be used in lieu of the latter two elements of the notice.
To avoid problems attendant to the omission or removal of
notice after registration, the bill provides that such omission
shall not cause loss of protection or prevent recovery for infringe-
ment against any person who begins an undertaking leading
to infringement after having received written notice of the design
protection. A suitable proviso is included to prevent recovery
against a person who began an undertaking leading to infringe-
ment before receiving written notice of a design protection.
Both two and three dimensional designs would be protected
53 H. R. 8873, 85th Congress, 1st Session (1957).
54 S. 2075, 86th Congress, 1st Session.
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under the provisions of the proposed bill but a stable or com-
monly known design, such as a standard geometric figure, an
emblem, or a motif would not. Further, any design which is
dedicated solely by function or purpose of the article embodying
the design would not be eligible for protection. Additionally
ineligible would be designs in the public domain unless the de-
sign for which protection is sought was created without actual
knowledge of the subject matter in the public domain. As in
our present Design Patent Law, protection under the proposed
Act would be lost if application for registration is not made
within a six-month period after the date on which the design was
first made known.
The proposed Act apparently would not provide for a novelty
test of any kind, but would require that each application sub-
mitted be examined to determine whether or not it relates to
a design subject to protection under the Act. Presumably, this
examination would have as its object the determination of
whether or not the design was a staple or commonly known
design, or was dictated solely by the function or purpose of the
article which embodies it. Whether the examination would also
be directed to the question of whether the design was "orna-
mental" is not entirely clear.
Provision is made for contesting a holding of the adminis-
trator adverse to the applicant, as well as for a publication and
opposition procedure, similar in some respects to that now used
in trademark cases. The only ground for opposition specified in
the proposed Act, however, is that the design is staple or com-
monly known.
In making application for a registration, the applicant must
make oath that to the best of his knowledge and belief, the de-
sign was created by the author named in the application; that
the design is original and has not previously been registered on
behalf of the applicant or his predecessor in title; that the de-
sign has been made known as provided in the Act; and that the
applicant is the person entitled to protection and to registration
under the Act. The certificate which issues on a given applica-
tion shall under the Act be admitted in any court as prima facie
evidence of the facts stated in it.
The term of protection provided for in the Act is five years
from the date upon which protection commenced, and is com-
puted from the date shown in the notice. While a design utilized
in the same form in a number of different articles is protected
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as to all articles when protected as to one of them, with only one
registration being required, protection in the particular design
lapses upon expiration of the term, regardless of the number of
different articles in which the design may have been utilized
during such term.
Under the Act anyone who makes, has made, or imports for
sale or use in trade an infringing article, or anyone who sells an
infringing article who did not make or import it, will be con-
sidered an infringer only if he induced or acted in collusion with
the manufacturer to make, or with the importer to import the
article, or if he refuses or fails, upon the request of the proprietor
of the design, to make a prompt and full disclosure of his source
of the infringing article and orders or reorders such article after
having received a personal written notice of the protection sub-
sisting in the design. Infringement is not deemed under the
Act to result when an infringing article is made, caused to be
made, sold, or imported without actual knowledge of the pro-
tected design.
Interestingly enough, the proposed Act contains a section
which provides that a manufacturer who incorporates in his own
product an infringing article acquired from others in the or-
dinary course of business shall not be deemed an infringer except
in those instances where he induced or acted in collusion with a
manufacturer to make the infringing article, or in cases where
he refuses or fails upon request of a design proprietor to make
a disclosure of his source of the article.
The scope of protection which would be granted by the pro-
posed act is somewhat narrower than that theoretically available
under the design patent statutes, in that an infringing article is
defined by the Act as any article the design of which has been
copied from the protected design without the proprietor's con-
sent. (Emphasis added.) Thus, protection is available only
against unauthorized copying. Where an article embodies only a
feature of the protected design which is dictated solely by the
function or purpose of the article or which is in the public do-
main, it is not considered to be an infringement. Unlike copy-
right, the presence of an illustration or picture of a protected de-
sign in a book, periodical, newspaper, photograph, broadcast, or
motion picture does not amount to an infringement of the pro-
tected design.
Where an infringement of a design protected under the pro-
posed Act occurs, the proprietor of the protected design would
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have a remedy by civil action instituted after the issuance of a
certificate of registration. In proper instances the courts having
jurisdiction would be permitted at their discretion to grant in-
junctions to prevent infringement, including temporary restrain-
ing orders and preliminary injunctions.
The court, upon a finding in favor of the design proprietor,
would also be empowered to award damages adequate to com-
pensate for the infringement, but these damages could in no event
be less than the reasonable value of the use made of the design
by the infringer in the course of the infringement. When dam-
ages are not found by a jury, the court shall itself assess them
and in any event may at its discretion award up to treble dam-
ages, but this award shall be considered as compensation to the
proprietor and not as a penalty. Recovery for any infringement
committed more than three years prior to the filing of a com-
plaint is barred absolutely.
As is the case relative to copyright infringement, the court
is given the power, pursuant to the proposed Act, to order de-
struction of all infringing articles, plates, molds, patterns, models,
or other means specifically adapted for producing the infringing
design.
Of particular interest is the relationship of the proposed
law to the copyright and design laws and it is this feature of the
proposed Act which has been the most controversial. On the
one hand, termination of protection of a design under the pro-
posed Act would result upon the issuance of a design patent.
Thus, should the proprietor of a protected design apply for and
be granted a design patent for an ornamental design which
comes within the purview of the proposed Act, his protection
under the proposed Act would come to an end. There is no
specific provision for the converse situation where the proprietor
of a design obtains patent protection first and then applies for
protection under the design patent law, but as a practical matter
it is doubtful that this situation would occur with any frequency
and in any event it would seem a reasonable view that prior
issuance of a design patent would act as a bar to subsequent
obtaining of a design registration.
On the other hand, where a copyright subsists for a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work which is utilized in the design of a
useful article by the copyright proprietor or under an express
license from him, the resulting design is regarded, under the
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proposed Act, as an original ornamental design of a useful article
and accordingly is subject to and dependent for protection on
compliance with the provisions of the proposed design act.
To bring the copyright law into harmony with this provi-
sion, the proposed act would itself amend Title 17, chapter 1 of
the United States Code by adding a section which would provide
that the ornamental design of a useful article shall not be sub-
ject to copyright and that where a pictorial, graphic, or sculp-
tural work in which copyright subsists is utilized in the design
of a useful article, protection will be dependent upon the design
act. The section proposed to be added to the copyright act would
define a useful article as one normally having an intrinsic func-
tion other than merely to portray its own appearance or to con-
vey information.
A number of miscellaneous provisions are also set forth in
the bill which more or less parallel those in both the copyright
law and the design law. Penalties are provided for certain situa-
tions in which false marking has been done or a false representa-
tion has been made in securing the certificate of registration.
Provision is also made for correction of errors in certificates, for
transfer of ownership, for priority based on the filing of foreign
applications, for cancellation of a registration in instances where
the court deems it appropriate, and so on.
The second bill introduced in the 86th Congress is entitled
"A Bill to Encourage the Creation of Original Ornamental De-
signs for a Limited Time Against Unauthorized Copying and to
Preserve Copyright Protection for Creators of Artistic Works for
which Copyrights Subsist." 5 This bill differs from the one pre-
viously discussed in but two ways. One of these is the term of
protection and the other is the relationship to the copyright
law. Under the second bill, protection would be available for
an initial term of five years and for second and third extensions
of five years each, for a total protected term of fifteen years.
The relationship of the second bill to the copyright law is
substantially different from that of the first, in that the proprietor
of a copyright in a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work will be
required to rely for protection upon the design act only where
he marks the design or article embodying the design with the
statutory design notice, or where he makes an application for
registration of the design pursuant to the design act for the
55 S. 2852, 86th Congress, 2d Session (Talmadge Bill).
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol11/iss2/18
11 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)
purpose of securing protection under that act. Where these two
contingencies occur, the resulting design is regarded as an origi-
nal ornamental design of a useful article and is from that time
forward subject to and dependent for protection upon compliance
with the provisions of the design act. Thus, the fact that a given
design in which copyright subsists is incorporated in a useful
article will not of itself force the copyright proprietor to turn
to the design act for protection. He is required to do this only
where he places the design notice on the article or seeks regis-
tration of the design under the Design Act.
Both revised bills have in principle received considerable
support from those concerned with protection of intellectual prop-
erty although certain specific provisions, particularly those deal-
ing with the relationship of the proposed design act to the copy-
right law have been the subject of some controversy.
The statement of Robert C. Watson,56 Commissioner of Pat-
ents, to Senator Eastland, Chairman of the Committee on the
Judiciary, urged that full consideration of the bill be given but
refrained from reaching a conclusion upon the bills pending re-
ceipt of statements from those industries concerned. The Com-
missioner expressed agreement with the thought behind the re-
lationship of S.2852 to the copyright law, indicating that where
one has a copyright in conventional copyright material, such as
a picture of statuary, he should be protected against copying
even though the copy may be placed upon a useful article and
even though the copyright proprietor may be publishing the
picture or statuary attached to or forming part of useful articles.
He felt, however, that perhaps S.2852 went too far, and that
some amendment to the copyright law would be needed in the
way of restriction and clarification to prevent useful articles from
being registered under the copyright law and to clarify the dis-
tinction in this respect.
L. Quincy Mumford, Librarian of Congress, in his statement
to Senator Eastland 57 urged favorable action on S.2075. Mr.
Mumford viewed both design patents and copyright law as in-
appropriate for protecting original designs in useful articles. This
view was based on the fact that too much time was required
for securing design patent protection and upon a feeling that
copyright protection was entirely too broad for designs, par-
56 Hearings, supra note 48, at 16.
57 Hearings, supra note 48, at 20.
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ticularly with respect to the term of protection and the failure
of the existing copyright laws to exempt innocent vendors and
secondary users from liability as infringers. Inasmuch as the
copyright law protects only those designs which can be separately
identified as works of art, large areas of ornamental designs are
not subject to protection, and Mr. Mumford considered this to
be inequitable.
He favored S.2075 on the belief that the immediate effect of
the passage of the bill would be the diminution of a number of
difficult legal and operational problems affecting the copyright
registration system. Mumford criticized S.2852 on the ground that
the term of protection was too long and on the further ground
that S.2852 would permit the continuance of existing long term
copyright protection for all types of copyrighted works which
could be used in the design of useful articles. He therefore rea-
soned that S.2852 failed to clarify the very problem which had
prompted legislative proposals in the first place.
Chief support for S.2852 is to be found among the motion
picture and allied interests who oppose the destruction of copy-
right protection in some works which would result from the
enactment of S.2075. These interests favor S.2852 because it
would afford design protection to those who desire it, and at
the same time would preserve the availability of the copyright
law for those to whom it is available and who desire to exercise
their rights under that law. They feel that S.2075 would place
artistic creators in an unfortunate predicament inasmuch as
under this bill when a work in which copyright subsists is
utilized in the design of a useful article, protection under the
copyright law would terminate. This problem, of course, is of
particular concern to the motion picture industry where, for
example, copyright in a two-dimensional Mickey Mouse design
would terminate when embodied in a Mickey Mouse doll, an
article which is arguably useful. Incidentally, among motion
picture interests, one of the most vigorous opponents of S.2075
appears to have been Walt Disney Productions.
Lest the preceding discussions convey the impression that
acceptance of S.2075 and S.2852 is universal, it should be noted
that support for them has been by no means unanimous even in
principle. The Department of Justice has objected to the pro-
posed legislation because of its historical opposition to legislation
designed to minimize or except certain practices or acts from
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the Anti-Trust Laws,58 and has indicated that the Bills may
present constitutional questions. At least one carpet manufac-
turer has objected to the bill on the theory that it would create
serious burdens and hardships by unduly limiting choice and
adoption of designs and by creating nuisance litigation in claims
of infringement despite reasonable efforts on the part of carpet
manufacturers to remain free of legitimate infringement
charges. 59
The proposed legislation has also been the subject of scat-
tered opposition as the result of their failure to stipulate novelty
requirements as a prerequisite to the conferring of protection.
Sunnary and Conclusions
It is currently clear that within that realm known as intel-
lectual property, a segment does, in fact exist, which may be
protected under either the copyright laws or under those laws on
design patents.
The influences which have given rise to this situation are
varied, but of primary significance among them seems to be a
haphazard statutory development in which the legislature has
failed to maintain a clear line of distinction between the forms
of protection with which we are presently concerned. A lack
of planned statutory growth has in turn been reflected in the at-
titudes of the courts and of the agencies charged with the ad-
ministration of the laws on intellectual property.
Be that as it may, the artisan who brings forth a design
which may be independently classified as a "work of art" may re-
sort either to copyright or to design patent to protect the fruits
of his labors. This, notwithstanding that the work may be in-
corporated in an otherwise utilitarian article. The dividing line
between that which may legitimately be classified a "work of
art" and that which may not is far from being well defined. In
general, however, it would appear that where those features
which constitute the article a "work of art" are capable of exist-
ing independently, a situation exists in which copyright laws and
design patent laws have dual applications.
In a situation in which either design patent or copyright will
lie, the designer or his attorney face an election of the form of
protection to pursue; for while the Supreme Court has yet to
58 Hearings, supra note 48, at 19.
59 Hearings, supra note 48, at 84.
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pass on the proposition, the lower courts are firmly entrenched
in the view that the designer is not entitled to both forms of
protection on the same work. Although mere patentability is not
sufficient to bar copyright on a given work, the taking out of a
patent on the work is sufficient to constitute a bar, and vice
versa.
When making a selection between forms, the attorney would
do well to consider seriously the use of copyright in preference
to design patent; the patentee's burdens in convincing the court
that his design rises to the dignity of patentable subject matter
are frequently overly taxing. Coupled with the additional ad-
vantages of economy, relatively long term protection, and a mini-
mum time lapse between application and registration, the copy-
right will very often be a more favorable protective measure than
the design patent.
Even so, it would seem that resort to the copyright laws for
protection of designs is at best a stop-gap approach. These laws
are not geared to protection of industrial designs. Indeed, the
scope of protection available under the copyright laws seems far
more sweeping than that which is either necessary or desirable
adequately to protect the interests of the design industry.
The design patent laws are too unwieldy to be particularly
useful. That design protection should have been incorporated
into the patent laws in the first place is itself a proposition of
dubious validity.
Yet it seems clear that some form of protection, gauged
specifically to the needs of the industrial designer, is needed.
The designer has, in his own way, a noticeable impact upon the
growth of the arts and the sciences. His efforts are as worthy
of limited recompense as those of the photographer, the painter,
the composer, the sculptor, or the writer.
As a practical matter, the designer appears in most cases to
be concerned with the prevention of outright plagiarism over a
relatively limited term. By its very nature, a design has com-
mercial value, usually, for only a relatively short period, per-
haps for a year or less in the case of the dress design. During
this term, a form of protection, comprehensive enough to give
adequate remedy against copying should be available.
Both bills which have been recently proposed are a long
stride forward in providing the kind of protection a designer
needs to conduct his business effectively without at the same time
subjecting his competitors to unwarranted restrictions. The bills
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as a whole are founded on solid principles and upon a thorough
study of the problem.
While it may be questioned whether S.2852 (with its pro-
vision permitting resort by some designers to the copyright laws
in preference to the proposed design registration laws) would in
fact be of as much assistance in establishing a well defined line
of demarcation between forms of protection as would S.2075,
either bill would be a significant improvement over the laws that
presently govern our actions.
The existing law on design protection is confusing and dis-
ordered, with the result that the application of law to facts is
frequently inequitable and lacking in uniformity. There has
historically been opposition to corrective legislation and there
probably always will be. Even so, it is high time steps were
taken to cut through the maze of contradictory decisions and con-
flicting statutes in order to establish a well planned and sensible
system for protection of designs in an equitable and efficient man-
ner.
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